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DOES PRIVACY REALLY HAVE A PROBLEM IN
THE LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE"
Daniel YeagerINTRODUCTION

In Privacy's Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure,'
and, to a lesser extent in The Substantive Origins of Criminal
Procedure,' William Stuntz praises the Supreme Court for
again having begun to align criminal procedure with modern
constitutional law by de-emphasizing privacy interests and
emphasizing the right to be free from unjustified police coercion.'
Nonetheless, according to Stuntz, the Court and leading
commentators like Wayne LaFave still worry too much about
"trivial" privacy interests in jacket pockets, glove compartments, cigarette packets, paper bags, and the underside of
stereos, while leaving police violence such as confronting suspects, grabbing them, punching them in the face, or killing
Copyright 1997 Daniel Yeager. All rights reserved.
Professor, California Western School of Law. I thank Karen
Beretsky, Sherry Colb, Don Dripps, Barry Friedman, Paul Gudel, Toni
Massaro, Chris Slobogin, Steve Smith, William Stuntz, and George
Thomas, III for their helpful comments on draft versions of this Article. I
also thank Heather Lamberg for her excellent research assistance and
Erik Wals for his thoughtful editing.
1. William J. Stuntz, Privacy's Problem and the Law of Criminal
Procedure, 93 MICH. L. REv. 1016 (1995) [hereinafter Privacy's Problem].
2. William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure,
105 YALE L.J. 393 (1995) [hereinafter Substantive Origins].
3. See Privacy's Problem, supra note 1, at 1068-78; Substantive Origins, supra note 2, at 433-42.
4. See Privacy's Problem, supra note 1, at 1063.
*

**
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them, severely under-regulated. For Stuntz, it is the violence
or coerciveness of police encounters with criminal suspects that
distinguishes police investigations from regulatory, privacyimplicating inspections of tax evaders, polluters, lawless
schoolchildren and government employees, unsafe workplaces,
and sub-par housing.'
In both articles, Stuntz sets out to reconcile the criminal and
regulatory worlds in a privacy sense. Considering the lack of
privacy protection against an IRS that investigates sensitive
matters such as our charitable donations," we may be better
off abandoning the privacy protection we are currently afforded
in our glove compartments. Stuntz posits that the existence of
police coercion justifies proscribing the criminal and regulatory
regimes differently because they inflict themselves on us differently, though the difference is more related to the presence or
absence of violence than to privacy. For example, as hostile as
the Internal Revenue Code may be to privacy, IRS forms do
not rough us up. Accordingly, privacy makes sense in modern
constitutional law terms mostly as a protection against "traumatizing" face-to-face encounters with police.
Michael Seidman has commented on the first of these two
recent additions to Stuntz's impressive oeuvre. In The Problems with Privacy's Problem,' Seidman observes that the world
that Stuntz's coercion thesis imagines, one which puts freedom
from coercion above privacy, really is the world in which we
live.9 Seidman and Stuntz differ only on the degree of truth in
Seidman's observation.
The position I have staked out, contrariwise, agrees with
Stuntz's conclusion that privacy retains a significant position
in the law of criminal procedure. From there I try to defend a

5. See id. at 1032, 1057; Substantive Origins, supra note 2, at 43337.
6. See Privacy's Problem, supra note 1, at 1033; Substantive Origins,
supra note 2, at 444-45.
7. See Privacy's Problem, supra note 1, at 1024.
8. Louis Michael Seidman, The Problems with Privacy's Problem, 93
MICH. L. REV. 1079 (1995).
9. See i&. at 1087 (stating that the Supreme Court's "focus is precisely where Stuntz says it should be: on violence, disruption, and humiliation").
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privacy-oriented procedural regime that can .be reconciled with
an activist regulatory state. Part One of this Article suggests
that the comparatively light judicial supervision of police coercion owes more to the conditions under which force is used
than to what Stuntz views as the Court's indifference to what
police do to us, or to its "obsession" over what police can see
and hear. By redescribing questions of privacy, or questions of
privacy and coercion, merely as questions of coercion, Stuntz's
attempt to correct the law of criminal procedure misfires linguistically and practically. The attempt misfires linguistically
because "coercion!' is used in an extended sense, and practically because his thesis can contribute only marginally, if at all,
to the reduction of police violence. Part Two explores the semantical distinctions between secrecy, privacy, and coercion in
order to reclaim what Stuntz rejects: a right to be free from
certain modes of police spying. Finally, Part Three argues that
regulatory actions are distinguishable from police actions not
solely by their lack of violence or coerciveness, but on grounds
that Stuntz sloughs off: that groups and individuals are different. The collective power of groups explains why we join them
and why we fear them and also explains why groups are more
vulnerable than individuals to meddlesome investigative practices.
I. THE COERCION THESIS

Stuntz's gripes are primarily with the Fourth Amendment's
regulation of searches and seizures. As he acknowledges, the
Fifth Amendment's regulation of confessions betrays a permissiveness toward trickery and bogus waivers that leaves little
sway for privacy and other soft norms.1" Even with the Fourth
Amendment, Stuntz quietly exempts from the "problem with
privacy" the privacy-based holdings that prohibit unjustified
ransackings of houses and warrantless electronic eavesdropping." He says those are unrepresentative of what police really do.' More typical police actions that vex Stuntz involve the

10. See Privacy's Problem, supra note 1, at 1070-71.
11. See ic.at 1060-62.

12. See ict at 1062. Although the vast majority of searches are conducted without a warrant, this by no means makes warrant searches
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"plain view" doctrine 13 and the "frisk" portion of Terry v.
Ohio" (both of which constrain police more than norms that
regulate police use of force), 5 jailing of suspects after warrantless arrests, 6 consent searches, 7 and police "stalking" of
suspects. 8 For Stuntz, the operation of these rules demonstrates that there is too much privacy and too much coercion in
police practices.
Although Stuntz worries that the Fourth Amendment makes
too much of what police may see and hear and not enough of
what they do to us, 9 he does recognize that police can see and
hear a lot.20 On a whim, police can hover over your property
2
3
in airplanes21 or helicopters,' sift through your garbage,
study your bank' and phone records, 25 trespass onto your
property, use your friends as undercover agents, 2 and
track your movements with transmitters hidden in your effects.' True, police need a good reason to look in your glove
compartment, 2 cigarette packet, 0 jacket pocket,"' paper
sack, 2 and the underside of your stereo,' and an even better
unrepresentative. See, e.g., RICHARD VAN DUIZEND ET AL., THE SEARCH
WARRANT PROCESS 17-24 (1985). Thanks to George Thomas for pointing
this out.
13. See Privacy's Problem, supra note 1, at 1022-23.
14. 392 U.S. 1 (1968); see Privacy's Problem, supra note 1, at 1065-66.
15. See Privacy's Problem, supra note 1, at 1043-44, 1066-67.
16. See id. at 1024 & n.31.
17. See icl. at 1063-65.
18. See id. at 1023.
19. See Substantive Origins, supra note 2, at 439-41.
20. See Privacy's Problem, supra note 1, at 1055-56 & n.138-44; Substantive Origins, supra note 2, at 444.
21. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 214 (1986).
22. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451-52 (1989).
23. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37 (1988).
24. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 437 (1976).
25. See-Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979).
26. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 176 (1984)..
27. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966).
28. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983).
29. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 800 (1982).
30. See Privacy's Problem, supra note 1, at 1019 (citing United
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)).
31. See id. at 1065-66 (discussing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).
32. See id. at 1056, 1063-64 (discussing Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S.
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reason to get into your house.' While this hardly sounds like
a greedy sense of privacy, Stuntz is right to say that when inspectors are after tax evaders, polluters, lawless schoolchildren
and government employees, or operators of unsafe workplaces
and owners of sub-par housing, the constraints on what they
may see and hear are measurably looser.
But is he right to justify the looser constraints because police rough us up but inspectors do not? Police do use force. If
they did not, then "seizure" and "arrest" would be empty
terms.' As to when and how much force they may use,
Stuntz says
the Court's answers are "thin," even "close to non36
existent."

I disagree. Coercion is adequately, though imperfectly, regulated. In attempting to prove that it is not, Stuntz is too brisk
and too dependent on a sense of "coercion" that stretches the*
word all out of shape. Ironically, Stuntz ends up demonstrating
the connection between privacy and coercion in Fourth Amendment law, though it is his stated intention to decouple them.
Moving from the most to the least violent, Stuntz's examples
of the under-regulated world of police coercion include: 1) various seizures, such as killing a fleeing felon, 37 roughing up a
diabetic,' or terrorizing innocent homeowners while an absent and not-so-innocent relative is sought;39 2) consent
searches; 0 3) police stalking of suspects, where police track
248 (1991)).

33. See id. at 1022-23 (discussing Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321
(1987)).

34. See id at 1024 (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980)).

35. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991) (stating that
an arrest "requires either physical force ... or, where that is absent,
submission to the assertion of authority"). But see SAN DIEGO COUNTY
SHERIFF'S DEP'T, DETENTION FACILITY SERVICES MANUAL OF POLICIES AND
PROCEDURES, SECURITY AND CONTROL, % 1.89, at 1 (1993) ("Placing handcuffs on an inmate in a department-approved manner, when the inmate

is not resisting, would not be considered a use of force.").
36. Substantive Origins, supra note 2, at 446.
37. See Privacy's Problem, supra note 1, at 1043 (discussing Tennessee
v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985)).
38. See id. at 1043-44 & n.93 (discussing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.
386 (1989)).

39. See id at 1066-68 (discussing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635
(1987)).

40. See id. at 1063-65 (discussing Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248
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their movements;4 ' and 4) the "plain view" doctrine, under
which police may seize evidence they find while doing something else.4" Stuntz objects that these doctrines betoken the
Court's indifference to police coercion. His proof lies in the
infrequency with which the Court reaches the merits of claims
of police coercion, and in the fuzzy reasonableness standard
that leaves police and suspects unsure of what the law demands of them on the street.43 Professor LaFave's treatise
does not help either, according to Professor Stuntz, with its
heavy tilt in favor of privacy norms."
The payoff here is disappointing, not just because Stuntz
misreads LaFave,45 but because requiring police to act reasonably, that is, not negligently, in rapidly unfolding street encounters is all we can do, a fact which Stuntz affirms and
denies at once.46 Indeed, Stuntz's point would have been more
convincing a decade ago than it is today.
47
Until 1985, when the Court decided Tennessee v. Garner,
only conscience-shocking uses of deadly force would be struck
(1991)).
41. See id at 1023 (discussing United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276
(1983)).
42. See i&L at 1022-23 (discussing Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321
(1987)).
43. See i. at 1043-44; Substantive Origins, supra note 2, at 446.
44. See Privacy's Problem, supra note 1, at 1043 & n.92, 1066 &
n.182, 1068.
45. In discussing LaFave's work, Stuntz says LaFave gives "almost no
discussion of limits on the degree of force used in conducting an otherwise permissible search" and only "brief treatment of excessive force
claims." I&. at 1066 n.182 (citing 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.2 (2d ed. 1987 & Supp. 1995)). But LaFave does address these
issues. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 5.1(d) (2d ed.
1987 & Supp. 1995) (discussing the use of force during an arrest); id §
5.2(i) (discussing the use of force to obtain evidence); 3 id. § 8.2(b) (discussing the use of force in consent cases); id § 9.2(d) (discussing the use
of force in Terry stops); id § 9.2(h) (discussing what force amounts to a
seizure). The latest edition further expands the sections on force. See 3
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.3(a)-(e) (3d ed. 1995).
46. See Privacy's Problem, supra note 1, at 1073-75 (affirming that
even vague standards, though problematic, are better than no standards);
id. at 1043-44 (arguing that the Court should focus on defining unreasonable coercion).
47. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
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down, and then on grounds unrelated to the law of seizures."
Since Garner, states may not authorize police to "seize an
unarmed, nondangerous suspect by shooting him dead."49 Instead, the suspect must be believed to be armed or to have
committed a violent felony, and burglary with the intent to
commit petty theft does not qualify. 0
What more can be done? Since the only desirable action
would be to catch the suspect or talk him into turning himself
in,5 1 police should try to do so, or consider those options, before resorting to shooting the suspect. When shooting is the
only option, warning shots or aiming low obviously are preferable to shooting to kill. Nothing in Garnerspecifically requires
as much, and that is a mistake. 2 If that is what Stuntz
means to criticize,' then I agree. I doubt, however (as does
Stuntz),' that deadly-force standards could be fashioned into

48. See Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1029, 1033-34 (2d Cir. 1973)
(holding that a single spontaneous incident of striking, grabbing and
threatening a prisoner did not shock the conscience and thus the complaint failed to properly state a claim against the warden).
49. Garner, 471 U.S. at 11.
50. See id.at 5. Specifically, the Court stated "[w]hile we agree burglary is a serious crime, we cannot agree that it is so dangerous as
automatically to justify the use of deadly force .... in fact, the available
evidence demonstrates that burglaries only rarely involve physical violence." Id. at 21.
51. Compare LEO KATZ, BAD AcTS AND GuiLTY MINDs: CONUNDRUMS
OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 65-66 (1987) ("To acquit someone on grounds of
necessity is to approve, support, applaud what he did. It is to find his
actions justified.") and George P. Fletcher, Proportionality and the Psychotic Aggressor: A Vignette in Comparative Criminal Law Theory, 8 ISR.
L. REV. 367, 373 (1973) ("We 'applaud' the justified actor's 'judgment' on
choosing the superior value.") with J.L. Austin, A Plea For Excuses, in
PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 176 (J.O. Urmson & G.J. Warnock eds., 3d ed.
1979) (to justify an action is "to give reasons for doing it, not to say to
brazen it out, to glory in it, or the like").
52. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 11-12 ("hus, if the suspect threatens the
officer with a weapon or there is some probable cause to believe that he
has committed a crime involving the infliction of ... serious physical
harm, deadly force may be used if necessary to prevent escape, and if,
where feasible, some warning has been given.") (emphasis added).
53. See Privacy's Problem, supra note 1, at 1043-44; Substantive Origins, supra note 2, at 446.
54. See Privacy's Problem, supra note 1, at 1073-75.
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narrow rules."
The same can be said of non-deadly-force standards. In a
1989 case, Graham v. Connor,5" where police mistook a diabetic for a belligerent drunk, the Court held that the scope of a
seizure must be tied to its justification, or must be, in a word,
reasonable.' This requirement may not control police violence
as effectively as would improved recruitment, training, and
supervision," but what would Stuntz suggest be done? In the
footnote he devotes to Graham, Stuntz notes, before dismissing
it as empty, that Graham invented a balancing formula that
weighs the quantum of force against resistance, flight, and the
apparent dangerousness of the suspected offense and offender.5" Again, what exactly is wrong with that?
Most assuredly, an obstreperous suspect who increases the
difficulty of making a peaceable seizure is situated differently
than a compliant suspect.' Just how differently is a bit under-articulated as the relevance of flight is discussed only in
61
Scalia's Bible-citing dictum in California v. Hodari D. As
mentioned above, when they can, police should threaten force
to induce compliance before using force; but otherwise, the
reasonableness of police violence is unalterably contingent on
facts, not rules. And because here, as so often is the case, we
see how wobbly appellate litigation is at controlling police, it
may be better to consign the business of more detailed rulearticulation to administrative control.6" Yet even administra55. See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
56. 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
57. See id at 396-99.
58. See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: REGULATION OF
POLICE INVESTIGATION 1-35 (1993).
59. See Privacy's Problem, supra note 1, at 1043 n.93; Substantive
Origins, supra note 2, at 446 n.239.
60. Cf United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 687-88 (1985) (explaining that a brief detention-may be prolonged by a suspect's own actions).
61. 499 U.S. 621, 624 n.1 (1991).
62. See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 57-59 (1969)
(arguing that when the legislature fails to provide specific standards,
administrators should create guidelines on their own); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349,

414-31 (1974) (proposing, like Davis, that search and seizure should be

conducted in conformity with reasonably particular legislation or policemade rules). See also Wayne R. LaFave, Controlling Discretion by Admin-
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tive efforts to articulate precisely when and how force may be
used unavoidably collapse into abstract standards. For instance, the San Diego Police Department's well-intentioned,
four-level "Force Continuum" establishing the conditions for,
inter alia, the use of "impact strikes with a defensive impact
weapon to the head, face and throat" ends up only admonishing that" "force which is... unreasonable or excessive, is prohibited. '
Another area where Stuntz sees the need to beef up regulation of police coercion is in the detention of suspects who are
arrested without a warrant and await a judge's ruling on the
validity of the arrest." Not long ago that practice was intolerably loose and individualized. For example, when Florida jailed
a suspect for fifteen days solely on a police officer's authority,6 5 the Court said the suspect's probable cause hearing was
unreasonably delayed, but offered no advice as to what it
meant by "prompt" or "timely."' In 1991, however, the Court
intervened to entitle arrestees to a judicial determination of
probable cause within two days, and even faster if the delay is
in bad faith." Although the Court could have gone further by
adopting the one-day maximum that Scalia proposed in his
dissent,' the rule the Court did adopt makes a categorical,
Miranda-type attempt at clarity which acknowledges that a
suspect's liberty is even more precious than scarce judicial
resources.
istrative Regulations: The Use, Misuse, and Nonuse of Police Rules and

Policies in Fourth Amendment Adjudication, 89 MIcH. L. REV. 442, 44751 (1990) (arguing that the exclusionary rule could be regulated by police

rule making).
63. See
3-5 (1993)
64. See
65. See
66. See

1.4, at
SAN DIEGo POLICE DEP'T PROCEDURE, USE OF FORCE
(on file with author).
Privacy's Problem, supra note 1, at 1024 & n.31.
Pugh v. Rainwater, 422 F. Supp. 498, 503 (S.D. Fla. 1976).
i&L; Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125-26 (1975) (establish-

ing that the probable-cause determination for pretrial detention must be
made either before or promptly after arrest).
67. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56-57 (1991)
(holding that when the probable-cause determination occurs later than 48
hours after arrest "the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate
the existence of a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance").

68. See id. at 68-70 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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If the forty-eight-hour rule has a blind spot regarding coercion, it is the admissibility of confessions made once the opportunity for a timely probable cause hearing has lapsed. Nothing
meaningful has come from the Court on this, though not for
lack of opportunity. 9 Since a suspect cannot make himself or
probable cause disappear once they materialize, 0 regulating
excessively lengthy detentions is at bottom a question of the
exclusionary rule's effect on confessions obtained after the two
days have run." Oddly, the Court's multi-factored "fruits" formula from Brown v. Illinois2 holds that time reduces the
spell that unconstitutional arrests cast on suspects. 3 As
LaFave insists, however, languishing in police custody increases, not decreases, the pressure on suspects.74 For commentators to continue to urge the Court to correct this misconception75 is, I imagine, just what Stuntz would want.
From these paradigmatic examples of coercion, which address the manner and length of detentions, Stuntz's coercion
thesis moves to more problematic examples, which extend our
ordinary understanding of coercion. One such example is his
angle on consent searches, which are justified if police first get
permission from someone whom they reasonably think can
grant it. 6 A familiar consent case that Stuntz talks about is
69. See Powell v. Nevada, 511 U.S. 79, 83 n.* (1994).

70. See United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474 (1980) (reiterating
that a defendant "cannot claim immunity from prosecution simply because his appearance in court was precipitated by an unlawful arrest").
71. See George C. Thomas III, The Poisoned Fruit of Pretrial Detention, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 413, 447-52 (1986) (analyzing whether the
exclusionary rule applies to pretrial detention violations).
72. 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
73. See id. at 603-04 But cf Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114 (holding that
"[o]nce the suspect is in custody . . . the suspect's need for a neutral
determination of probable cause increases significantly. The consequences
of prolonged detention may be more serious than the interference occasioned by arrest.").
74. See 4 LAFAVE, supra note 45, § 11.4(b) (stating that "the Court's
assumption that the mere passage of time between the arrest and the

confession increases the likelihood of the confession being untainted is
not sound. It ignores the possibilities for 'exploitation' inherent in the
time lapse factor, and that the illegal custody becomes more oppressive
as it continues uninterrupted.").
75. See Thomas, supra note 71, at 447-52.
76. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188-89 (1990) (holding that
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Florida v. Jimeno." There the Court ruled on the constitutionality of a Dade County police officer's search of Jimeno's
car."8 The officer had stopped Jimeno for a minor traffic infraction and told him that drug activity was suspected."9 The
issue was whether Jimeno's unqualified permission to search
the car should be read to include a paper sack found on the
floorboard."0 The majority admitted as evidence the cocaine
found in the bag because Jimeno should have qualified his
permission if that was what he meant." The dissent said that
because closed containers are especially private, the officer
should have stayed away from the paper sack, even without
special limiting instructions from Jimeno.'2
Stuntz says that Rehnquist's majority and Marshall's dissent
asked the wrong questions in Jimeno. Like jacket pockets,
paper lunch bags are convenient, not private, according to
Stuntz.' If privacy is the issue, he goes on, then it is easy to
see why Jimeno was denied relief.' For Stuntz, the "real
harm" in a case like Jimeno is not to privacy, but rather lies in
the indignity of being publicly singled out as a criminal suspect and the fear that flows from being targeted by uniformed, armed police officers. Street encounters are not like
house searches. The harm flows not from the search but from
the encounter. The question should not be whether the officer
had the suspect's permission to look at something. Permission
will always be more fictive than real anyway. Rather, the
question should be whether the officer's behavior was too
coercive given the reason for the encounter. It is not the reasonableness of looking in the paper bag that ought to matter;

police may enter premises without a warrant if a reasonable officer
would believe "that the consenting party had authority over the premises").

77. 500 U.S. 248 (1991).
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id. at 249.
id.at 251.
id.
id. at 251-52.
id. at 253 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Privacy's Problem, supra note 1, at 1063.
id. at 1064.
id
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it is the reasonableness of treating Jimeno like he was a
probable drug courier. By focusing on privacy and information gathering, the law fails to engage the real issue.86
This instance of Stuntz's coercion thesis gives the Court too
little credit. Both Rehnquist and Marshall know the real issue.
Eighteen years earlier they were on opposite sides of another
traffic-stop case, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte," which held that
"
consent to search is valid only in "the absence of coercion.
Rehnquist's thirty-page majority opinion mentions privacy just
once, and then in the most generalized, cich6d terms." Of the
five other opinions in Bustamonte, only Brennan's one-page
dissent sees consent as a matter of privacy." Coercion did not
come up in Jimeno because there was too little of it to make a
difference. In fact, as both the Court9 1 and Stuntzj9 2 accept

that an arrestee can consent to being interrogated without
raising questions of intolerable police coercion, it follows that
Bustamonte and Jimeno, neither of whom was arrested, could

86. I& at 1064-65.
87. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
88. Id. at 227. "[S]ubmission to a claim of lawful authority," id. at
233, or to "express or implied," threats, id. at 227, does not constitute
consent. In addition, factors relevant to the voluntariness of consent include "subtly coercive police questions, . . . the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person who consents," id at 229, and "the subject's
knowledge of a right to refuse." Id. at 248-49.
89. See id. at 242 ("[Ihe Fourth Amendment protects 'the security of
' (quoting
one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police ....
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949)).
Stuntz does acknowledge Rehnquist's opinion, but not in Privacy's
Problem. See William J. Stuntz, Waiving Rights in Criminal Procedure,
75 VA. L. REv. 761, 787 (1989) [hereinafter Waiving Rights] (stating
Bustamonte's voluntariness "standard ... focuses quite clearly . . . on
whether the police behaved coercively and not on whether the waiving
individual made a knowledgeable, self-interested choice").
90. See Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 277 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The
Court holds today that an individual can effectively waive this right even
though he is totally ignorant of the fact that, in the absence of his consent, such invasions of his privacy would be constitutionally prohibited.").
91. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966) (holding that
the defendant may waive the rights of silence and counsel "provided the
waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently").
92. See Waiving Rights, supra note 89, at 801-25 (discussing different
contexts in which rights can be waived).
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obviously consent to searches of their belongings.
But suppose Jimeno's encounter was too coercive. Too coercive for what? For a traffic infraction? How much coercion does
a traffic infraction call for? Certainly police can stop and ticket
bad drivers. Jimeno's brief encounter featured no touching, no
handcuffing, and no tough talk So if it is not the stopping of
bad drivers that is too coercive (otherwise we should scrap our
vehicle codes), and if it is not the request to search the car that
is too coercive (otherwise permission would be the real issue),
then it must be the officer's telling Jimeno that he suspected
him of drug activity that was too coercive. But again, too coercive for what? Jimeno presumably should not be able to bring a
section 1983 suit against the officer for calling Jimeno a "druggie." So for the officer to get into the paper sack, the encounter
must have been too coercive. Thus there is no way to untie the
discovery of the cocaine from the question of whether the officer extorted Jimeno's permission.
Whether the issue is consent searches of paper bags or another problematic example of Stuntz's-police stalking of suspects-Stuntz pushes his sense of coercion too far. Asking
someone for permission to search and apprising them, as in
Jimeno, of their right to refuse, or following someone around,
are police practices that lack even a family resemblance to
what we mean when we say "police brutality." Like thunderstorms or some electric guitar riffs, these actions are coercive
or violent only metaphorically.93 But to use "coercion" or "violence" metaphorically or specially, as Stuntz does, threatens to
wipe out the very distinction on which he relies: that police
rough us up, but inspectors do not.
If Stuntz thinks Jimeno was coerced, then I wonder what he
makes of Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States94 and
United States v. Biswell 5 where inspectors conducted thorough, warrantless, nonconsensual searches of businesses that

93. See Donald A. Dripps, More on Distinguishing Sex, Sexual Expropriation, and Sexual Assault: A Reply to Professor West, 93 COLUM. L.

REV. 1460, 1463 (1993) ("Of course, it is within the limits of the language to say that sex is violence. Thunderstorms are 'violent,' and so are

electric guitar riffs.).
94. 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
95. 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
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dealt in the heavily regulated worlds of liquor and firearms,
respectively. In Colonnade, the Court invalidated a search and
seizure by IRS agents who broke down a door without express
statutory authorization,9 though dissenting Justice Black was
97
convinced that congressional silence equals approval. In
Biswell, the Court allowed local and federal inspectors to coerce Biswell's consent to search a storeroom because Congress
said warrantless searches of firearms dealers were permissible.9" In a dissent with which I imagine Stuntz would agree,
Justice Douglas complained that "a search conducted over the
objection of the owner of the premises sought to be searched is
'forcible' whether or not violent means are used to effect the
search.""
Colonnade and Biswell are exotic, I know. Congress always
provides, though the Court does not always require,"' that if
the search victim objects to an inspection, then the inspector
can get a warrant, or seek to punish, sue, or ban the objecting
party from the activity, whether it be the liquor, arms, mining, 1 1 or junkyard0 2 businesses, working for the government, 3 or playing high school sports.'"' So Stuntz is cor96. See Colonnade, 397 U.S. at 77 ("Under the existing statutes Congress selected a standard that does not include forcible entries without a
warrant.").
97. See id. at 80-81 (Black, J., dissenting) (stating that federal statutes give IRS agents implied authority to use force to break open locked
doors).
98. See Biswell, 406 U.S. at 314-15 ("When the officers asked to inspect respondent's locked storeroom, they were merely asserting their
statutory right.").
99. Id. at 318-19 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
100. See Colonnade, 397 U.S. at 77 (invalidating warrantless,
nonconsensual search of liquor store for failure to observe statutory limits
on inspections).
101. See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 607 (1981) (holding that a
warrantless inspection of stone quarries, covered by the Federal Mine
Safety Act of 1977, is constitutionally valid).
102. See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 703-12 (1987) (holding
that a state statute authorizing warrantless inspections of vehicle dismantling businesses is constitutionally valid).
103. See Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725-26 (1987) (holding that a
warrant is not required to search a government employee's work area if
the circumstances are reasonable).
104. See Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist., 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2397 (1995)
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rect that police can lawfully coerce us more than inspectors
can, but only in reference to police actions that comport with
an ordinary understanding of "coercion" as opposed to the
extended sense into which he falls.' Stuntz's extended sense
of coercion easily describes not only Colonnade and Biswell,
but also encounters in which, for example, schoolteachers
search students' belongings,0 6 inspectors enter private property to assess the safety"° or habitability"'3 of premises, or
when public employers demand that employees produce blood
09
In such instances, the students, managers, and
or urine."
coerced, even though they may refuse the
feel
employees
search, and even if they have, as Stuntz states, "implicitly
bargained" away their privacy."' Indeed, is it really so evident that being followed around by police as you drive over
public highways is more coercive than finding university officials rummaging through your desk at the public law school
where you teach?
Nevertheless, characterizing the question in Jimeno as one
of permission (as it is in Colonnade and Biswell) does not mean
that Jimeno's case is only about privacy and not coercion. The
case is about both, as are most search-and-seizure and confession cases. Consider, for instance, Chimel v. California,"'
which held that the power to arrest includes a limited power to
search the arrestee and the area immediately within his reach.
(stating the warrantless search of a student is permissibl- when the
"government acts as guardian and tutor" in a reasonable manner).
105. See Waiving Rights, supra note 89, at 803, 807-14.
106. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 343 (1985) (holding
search of student's purse was reasonable).
107. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 325 (1978) (holding

that a warrant is required for OSHA officials to inspect business premises).
108. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538-40 (1967) (holding that administrative searches by municipal health and safety inspectors require a warrant).
109. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656,
677 (1989) (holding that a warrant was not needed to conduct government drug testing program).
110. William J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Government Power, and the
Fourth Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 553, 567-85 (1992) (discussing

trade-offs between government benefits and intrusions of privacy).
111. 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
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If privacy were the only value promoted by limits on searches
and seizures, then we should not permit any searches based
solely on arrests absent some reason to believe the suspect has
a weapon or will destroy evidence. But Chimel demands no
such belief. If, conversely, liberty or freedom from coercion
were the only protected value, then contemporaneous searches
of arrestees would be more closely circumscribed than-searches
of their property, since aggressions against persons are worse
than aggressions against property."2 But this is not the case.
As decisions like Chimel suggest, there is no singular value
sheltered by the Fourth Amendment.
Another example of the interplay between privacy and liberty interests and other "soft" norms"1 in Fourth Amendment
law is the meaning of "seizure." A typical seizure takes place
when police "intentionally""4 get a suspect to "submit to police authority"1 5 because he feels he is not "free to leave."" 6
But when the suspect is at home, work, or otherwise constrained by his own itinerary and not by the actions of police, a
seizure takes place only if the suspect feels as though he is not
"free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate
the encounter." 7 Clearly, these two formulations are different. Freedom to leave is literally. a matter of liberty; freedom to
terminate an encounter sounds more like a restatement of half
of the Miranda"' rule-the half of Miranda that protects
suspects' privacy of thought rather than their freedom of move112. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 489 (Deering 1872 & Supp. 1995)
(punishing grand theft with imprisonment not exceeding one year) with
id. § 213 (punishing robbery with imprisonment up to 6 years).
113. See Daniel B. Yeager, Categorical and Indiuidualized Rights-Ordering on Federal Habeas Corpus, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 669, 669, 69194 (1994) (stating that consideration of soft norms such as privacy, liberty, dignity, consensuality, participation, adversariness, and a preference

for enlightened investigative techniques arguably oppose the criminal
trial's purpose of determining factual guilt).
114. Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 597 (1989).
115. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 629 (1991) (assuming that

pursuit by police officer could be a "show of authority").
116. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968) (holding that whenever an
officer "accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he
has 'seized' that person").
117. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 433, 436 (1991).

118. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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ment."9 The very fact that the Court's "seizure" rule has two
formulations is evidence that seizures, justified or not, invade
both privacy and liberty interests at once.
Miranda,too, is a clear and high example of the interplay of
privacy and liberty interests in criminal procedure. Asking
suspects "where were you last night?"120 compels them to
talk, but only when they are in custody.12 ' Likewise, placing
suspects in custody means nothing to Miranda unless police
try to get them to "fess up."' The harder police push with
their questioning, the more physical constraint suspects will
sense. Similarly, the greater their degree of physical constraint, the more vulnerable suspects will be to any police
suggestion. In other words, police custody would not be so bad
if police were not using it to get at suspects' private thoughts;
nor would police be likely to get at suspects' private thoughts
were it not for the pressures of custody. I am not suggesting
that the Court's decisions in confession cases support my point;
in actuality, they do not. Those cases often wrongly ignore that
it is the interplay of both privacy and liberty interests-and
neither alone-that makes un-Mirandized statements presumptively compelled and therefore inadmissible.' Yet, despite the affinity of privacy and liberty interests, Stuntz denies
their interrelation, not only by extending our ordinary sense of
coercion, but, as I hope now to demonstrate, by compressing
our ordinary sense of privacy.

119. See id. at 460 (finding a right of a "private enclave" where a
private life may be led).

120. Icdat 536 (White, J., dissenting).
121. See Thompson v. Keohane, 116 S. Ct. 457, 465 (1995) (declaring
"two discrete inquiries are essential to the determination [of custody]:
first, what were the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and
second, given those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt

he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.").
122. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980).

123. See Yale Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah and Miranda:
What Is "Interrogations?When Does it Matter?, in POLICE INTERROGATION
AND CoNFESSIoNs: ESSAYS IN LAW AND POLICY 139, 195-96 (1980); Daniel
Yeager, Rethinking Custodial Interrogation, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1

(1990) (both discussing the interplay between interrogation and custody).
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II. SECRECY, PRIVACY, AND COERCION
Sweet Mephistopheles, so charm me here / That I may walk
invisible to all / And do whate'er I please unseen of any.
Christopher Marlowe, Doctor Faustus'M
To get a fuller view of the coercion thesis and its consequences, more must be known about Stuntz's thoughts on
encounterless or nonconfrontational police actions. If Stuntz is
correct-that protection of paper sacks and other closed containers should be a matter of freedom from coercion and not a
matter of privacym-does that mean he approves of closed
container searches if the suspect is absent or does not see the
search take place? How would the coercion thesis interpret the
acts of a police officer who, in a place he has a right to be, on a
whim opens Robinson's cigarette package," Belton's zippered
Lafayette's shoulder bag," or Jimeno's
jacket pocket,'
paper sack?" This, by the way, is what Officer Biro did in
3 Was Biro's snooping an unjustiUnited States v. Ceccolini."'
fied search because it was an envelope in which he looked?"3 '
So there are private and nonprivate, worthy and unworthy
closed containers? That cannot be the law.3 Please recognize
124. CHRISTOPHER MARLOwV, THE TRAGICAL HISTORY OF THE LIFE AND
DEATH OF DOCTOR FAUSTUS, sc. 9, lines 12-13 (John D. Jump ed.,
Methuen & Co. 1962 (1624)).
125. See Privacy's Problem, supra note 1, at 1064-65 (declaring that the
"real question" in search and seizure cases is "whether the officer's behavior was too coercive").
126. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 223 (1973).
127. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 462 (1981) (holding that
power of arrest included power to search arrestee's jacket).
128. See Illinois v. Lafayette, .462 U.S. 640, 646-47 (1983) (deciding
search of arrestee's bag was a valid inventory search).
129. See Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991).
130. 435 U.S. 268, 268 (1978).
131. See id. at 280-81 (holding that an officer's unconstitutional discovery of "policy slips" in an envelope did not require suppression of the
testimony of a witness who was discovered because of the officer's unlawful search).
132. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822 (1982) ("[A] constitutional distinction between 'worthy' and 'unworthy' containers would be
improper"); Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 426 (1981) (holding that
the Fourth Amendment "protects people and their effects, and it protects
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that Stuntz is not duplicating Scalia's position in Californiav.
Acevedo ---that container searches should take place on
probable cause without regard to the nature of the container.' s Instead, Stuntz's coercion thesis requires no antecedent
suspicion at all to authorize encounterless or nonconfrontational invasions of closed containers."s
To get a sense of Stuntz's overemphasis of the significance of
encounters or confrontations with police, consider United
States v. Knotts.3 6 In that case, the seller of a can of chloroform allowed police to place an electronic beeper in the can so
they could track it and its possessors. The Court held that the
use of the beeper was not a search of the can or the car in
which it traveled because the beeper did nothing that visual
surveillance could not."31 Here again, Stuntz thinks the Court
misses the point. To Stuntz, Knotts is a case about stalking."s The driver of the car knew police were following him,
so he felt coerced into driving evasively.13 But suppose the
driver did not know he was being followed. In that case, Stuntz
would say that no search occurred because the sense of coercion is missing.
There is something strange about saying that spying must
be "felt" in order to be wrong. This is not to say that undetected spying is as bad as stalking; it probably is not. Stalking describes the constant, one-sided spying that made Bentham's
Panopticon-a work camp where inmates knew a guard would
surveil them from a central tower into which the prisoners
could not see-such a brilliant method of control, without the
high costs of a dungeon's isolation.14 But as punitive as

those effects whether they are 'personal' or 'impersonal'. Once placed

within such a container, a diary or a dishpan are equally protected
") (citations omitted).
133. 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
134. See ida at 584 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
135. See generally Privacy's Problem, supra n.te 1, at 1068-79 (present-

ing applications of the coercion thesis to search and seizure cases).
136. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
137. See id. at 285.
138. See Privacy's Problem, supra note 1, at 1023-24.
139. See id. at 1024.
140. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF
THE PRISON 199-200 (Alan Sheridan trans., 2d ed. 1995).
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stalking may be, it only partially captures what is wrong with
spying. Greek myth has it that Gyges, a barbarian, succumbed to the king of Lydia's requests that he spy on the
king's own wife and "peruse her person" while she undressed.14 ' Gyges knew well the old saying "[1Iet each look on
"142
or, in the queen's words, to not "behold what is
his own,
not lawful for you." 43 So when he "gazed on her [nakedness]," Gyges knew he acted "wickedly."'" Certainly what
made Gyges's actions unjust had nothing to do with his being
caught. Thus not only is Justice Stevens correct when he says
that "[a] bathtub is a less private area when the plumber is
" 4 5 but the reverse is true
present even if his back is turned,
as well: the plumber's presence ruins the privacy of even a
blind or inattentive bather. Spying does lose some of its agaggresgressiveness when it is undetected, though it remains
146
undebut
on,
spied
being
sive to the extent that we fear

141. See HERODOTUS, THE
trans., 1942).

PERsIAN WARS,

Chs. 8-10 (George Rawlinson

142. k ch. 9.
143. Id. ch. 11.
144. Though less so than he would later, when, under pressure from

the queen, he sneaked into the royal chamber and fatally stabbed the
sleeping king. See id. chs. 8-14.
In Plato's The Republic, Glaucon told a different version of the
myth. See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC §§ 359c-360d, at 37-38, § 612b, at 295
(Allan Bloom ed., 2d ed. 1991). Gyges stole a ring from a corpse he discovered after an earthquake. See i&. § 359d, at 37. When Gyges learned
that by turning the collet of the ring towards himself he would become
invisible, he used this power to seduce the queen and seize the empire.
See id. §§ 359e-360a, at*37. Glaucon argues that even a just man with
Gyges's ring could not "stick by justice and bring himself to keep away
from what belongs to others and not lay hold of it, although he had
license to take what he wanted from the market without fear." Id §§
360b-d, at 38. Socrates, however, ultimately instructs Glaucon that "the
soul must do the just things, whether it has Gyges's ring or not." Id. §
612b, at 295.
145. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 735 (1984) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part).
Postmodern
a
Is
What
Balkin,
J.M.
generally
146. See
Constitutionalism?,90 MICH. L. REV. 1966, 1986-88 (1992) (describing the
growth in surveillance technology, how fear of surveillance can be used to
coerce behavior, and the impact of increased availability of information
upon liberal political philosophy).
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tected spying never loses its privacy-bashing essence. "
Stuntz acknowledges the harm of undetected spying by exempting two "paradigmatice encounterless searches from his
thesis: house searches and wiretaps.14 But why exempt
them? Stuntz explains that the contents of houses and phone
conversations are "personal"4 and "plausibly distinguishable
from the kinds of information the state seeks for regulatory
purposes,"15° though elsewhere he admits that "[tihere is no
privacy-based reason for treating [regulatory] searches differently from police searches; the overbreadth phenomenon 5' is
the same in both settings." 2 Despite this wrinkle, for Stuntz
it makes sense in privacy terms that police need a very good
reason to raid our houses or intercept our phone calls.
The coercion thesis thus leaves some room for privacy without coercion, but only for "good secrets," which concern what
we do and keep in our houses and what we say on the phone,
as opposed to "bad secrets," which concern those outside-thehouse facts like the concealment of a sandwich in a paper sack.
But even the house loses some of its luster in Stuntz's regime.
For example, Stuntz says that Arizona v. Hicks" depicts the
Hicks instantiates the
Court's obsession with secrecy.'
"plain view" doctrine, which allows police to seize evidence as a
bonus if they discover it while lawfully searching for or seizing
something or someone else.'5 5 In Hicks, the Court held that a
police officer who lawfully entered Hicks's apartment soon

147. Cf. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964). In

Massiah, the Court quoted with approval the following language from
Judge Hays's dissent in the court of appeals: "Massiah was more seriously imposed upon because he did not even know that he was under interrogation by a government agent." United States v. Massiah, 307 F.2d 62,
72-73 (2d Cir. 1962) (Hays, J., dissenting), rev'd, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
148. See Privacy's Problem, supra note 1, at 1060-62.
149. Id- at 1063.

150. Id-at 1061.
151. Seidman calls the injury to privacy caused by the overbreadth
phenomenon "collateral damage." Seidman, supra note 8, at 1086-92.
152. Privacy's Problem, supra note 1, at 1039.
153. 480 U.S. 321 (1987).

154. See Privacy's Problem, supra note 1, at 1022-23 (discussing Hicks,
480 U.S. at 321).
155. See Hicks, 480 U.S. at 321.
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after Hicks had shot his neighbor through the floor could look
only for Hicks absent independent probable cause to look for
something else.'56 While there, the officer also peeked- under
Hicks's turntable to get the serial numbers to find out if the
two fancy stereos in the "squalid" apartment were stolen,
which they were. 57 Because the officer lacked probable cause
that the stereos were stolen, moving a turntable for inspection
was an unjustified search." As a result, Hicks got away with
theft, but not with the stereos.
Stuntz objects to Hicks, which he reads as saying that "each
marginal search, each additional place where the officer casts
his eye, represents a separate issue and ought to be separately
justified."59' We are wrong, Stuntz insists, to privilege Hicks's
right to keep a stereo's serial numbers secret over his right to
be free from unjustified invasions of his home and from police
coercion (which, like Hicks himself, was absent)."60 Thus for
Stuntz, what matters in Hicks is not the officer's roving eye,
but "the legality of the search of the apartment in general." 6 '
But searches are never general.'62 Surely Stuntz is not saying that the right to enter a house is the right to ransack it.
Stuntz knows that searches must be carried out, not just initiated, in a reasonable manner.' Stuntz also knows that an
officer can cast his eye anywhere he wants-that's why we call
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

See id. at 326.
See id
See id
Privacy's Problem, supra note 1, at 1023.
See State v. Hicks, 707 P.2d 331, 332 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (apartment manager opened door for police, who "[nfn a quick search . . . de-

termined that no people were in the apartment."), aff'd, 480 U.S. 321
(1987).

161. Privacy's Problem, supra note 1, at 1023.
162. See, eg., Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987) (requiring

a description of the particularplace to be searched before a warrant may
be issued); Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295 n.2 (1973) (stating that
when conducting a warrantless search the officer's action must be reason-

ably related to the circumstances which justified the search in the first
place).

163. See Privacy's Problem, supra note 1, at 1066-68 (pointing out that
the Court in Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987), and many
commentators fail to discuss the Fourth Amendment implications of the
officer's conduct during the search).
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it "plain view." 1" To be sure, the police had good cause for

being in Hicks's apartment, but unless they thought Hicks, or
his gun, was hiding beneath or behind the turntable, they were
no more justified in moving the stereo than they would have
been in pumping Hicks's stomach or looking for him in a jewelry box. The serial numbers were hidden, so the "view" was not
at all "plain." Perhaps what annoys Stuntz is that where the
police looked, like an "open field," was not 'likely to contain
the sorts of things ordinary people wish to keep to themselves."" 5 But how could the police know that nothing private
would be there? A turntable can hide a love letter or an ACLU
membership card, each bespeaking facts that in no sense
trivialize what we mean by "private."
Although the meaning of "private" is wider than the meaning of "secret,". Stuntz uses the terms interchangeably. Stanley
Cavell employs a less stingy or more ordinary definition of
private when he writes that "[a] private conversation is one
that I do not want others to hear, not one they necessarily
cannot hear. My private entrance is one through which I can
invite others; in principle, anyone in the world can be as well
acquainted with it as I am." 66 While CaveU's reflections are
meant to capture a metaphysical as opposed to political sense
of privacy, still he reminds us that privacy largely depends on
the intentions of the interest-holder. We may safely assume
that, to paraphrase Edward Shils, those who intend to conceal
mean to control the outward flow of information about themselves, regardless of whether the information is embarrassing 67 and regardless of the unimagined risks that eavesdropping and betrayal pose.' But generous conceptions of priva164. See i&L at 1023 n.28 (recognizing that the violation in Hicks did

not arise from where the officer looked, but from what he moved).
165. Id, at 1029. But see id. at 1030 (stating that "houses, unlike

fields, do contain things that most people want to keep to themselves").
166. STANLEY CAVELL, THE CLAIM OF REASON 330 (1979). See also

SISSELA BOK, SECRETS 288 n.20 (1982) (collecting sources on relation of

secrecy to privacy).
167. See Edward Shils, Privacy: Its Constitution & Vicissitudes, 31 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 281, 291 (1966).

168. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971) ("Inescapably, one contemplating illegal activities must realize and risk that his

companions may be reporting to the police. If he sufficiently doubts their
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cy like Cavell's, Shils's, Brandeis's familiar "right to be let

alone," 16 9 or even the one found in F/orida v. Riley, 70 are
too open for Stuntz, too hard to pin down. They are, as such,
too easily converted into an obsession over what police may see
and hear.
At its worst, privacy is a greedy concept that promotes hypersensitivity or an unjustified wish to manipulate and defraud others. Here I borrow from Judge Posner, who, like
Stuntz, is less skeptical of seclusional claims, i.e., our right to
retire from the public to the private, than he is of secrecy or
informational claims that do nothing but enhance one's reputation by keeping others in the dark unless the secret or information has some innovative or entrepreneurial component.'
If "good" privacy claims are seclusional and "bad" privacy
claims are strictly secretive or informational, and provide no
competitive advantage in a market, then does that mean closed
containers such as cars, pockets, paper bags or cigarette packets ordinarily are not sources of seclusional interests? Because
Stuntz thinks these places are about convenience, not privacy,
he would replace privacy protection in containers with an emphasis on what police do to us to reveal the contents of those
containers. 2
Obviously we are at an impasse: I say closed containers are
private, in part because coercion is not the Fourth
Amendment's only worry; Stuntz says they are not private
because privacy invasions tend to matter only when they are
occasioned by police coercion.' If we treat this as an empirical problem in need of laborious questioning, Chris Slobogin

trustworthiness, the association will very probably end or never materialize. But if he has no doubts, or allays them, or risks what doubts he
has, the risk is his.").
169. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
170. 488 U.S. 445 (1989). In Riley, Justices O'Connor, Blackmun,
Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens agreed we have a right to be free from

unusual modes of spying.
171. See Richard S. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393,
403 (1978).
172. See Privacy's Problem, supra note 1, at 1065-66; Substantive Origins, supra note 2, at 440-42, 446.
173. See Privacy's Problem, supra note 1, at 1065-66.
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and Joseph Schumacher's survey strongly implies that closed
containers are private. 4 But because Stuntz's aim is to impose coherence on modem constitutional law, he must foreclose
on the privacy of closed containers.'
For Stuntz, an adequate account of why there is more privacy protection in criminal, as opposed to regulatory, modes of
investigation must lie outside of the meaning and operation of
"privacy."'7 6 Thus we get his coercion thesis, whose force depends on redescribing questions of privacy, or questions that
implicate privacy and coercion not to mention property,"
merely as questions of coercion. The upshot of Stuntz's coercion
thesis is to regulate less, not more, police actions, e.g.,
encounterless quests for evidence, and to contribute only nominally to the control of police violence. 8 Moreover, I doubt
that Stuntz's strategy is the only way to reconcile the criminal
and regulatory worlds.
III. INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS
By now we know that Stuntz believes there is too much
privacy and too much coercion in criminal procedure. Part of
his proof that criminal suspects have too much privacy is that
landlords, manufacturers, public employees, and schoolchildren
have so little.Y According to Stuntz, the loose constitutional
constraints on regulatory inspections rightly minimize privacy,
whereas the tighter constraints on criminal investigations

174. Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expec.

tations of Privacy and Autonomy in FourthAmendment Cases: An Empirical Look at 'Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society," 42
DuKE L.J. 727, 737-64 (1993) (confirming that while we place the most

cherished privacies of life in our phone conversations and our houses,
which contain our books and papers, searches of office drawers, trunks of
cars, footlockers found in cars, and of schoolchildren's lockers were also

rated as significantly invasive).
175. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
176. See Privacy's Problem, supra note 1, at 1044.
177. See generally id. For a discussion of property law's relation to the

Fourth Amendment, see Daniel B. Yeager, Search, Seizure, and the Positive Law: Expectations of Privacy Outside the Fourth Amendment, 84 J.
CRnL. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 249 (1993).
178. See Privacy's Problem, supra note 1, at 1071-78.
179. See id. at 1038-39.
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wrongly maximize privacy.' ° This does not mean, he adds,
that criminal and regulatory quests for evidence should be
identically constrained. They should not, he continues, not because of divergent privacy interests in the two settings, but
because criminal investigations depend on coercive police-suspect encounters that are in dire need of judicial control. Thus,
insofar as police rough us up but inspectors do not, it makes
sense to Stuntz that inspectors can get away with more
or low-suspicion evidence-gathering than police
suspicionless
181
can.
As Stuntz says, regulatory inspectors' advantages over police
are evident in the Court's cases which have held that: 1) corporations and other institutions have no privilege against selfincrimination and "only slight" Fourth Amendment protection;
and 2) individuals often are forced to prepare and produce
incriminating documents and other evidence. 18 2 Stuntz argues that these doctrinal moves, among others, were a matter
of "political necessity"" because "government cannot be very
activist if it cannot force people to tell it things. """
So force us it does, and often with little or no suspicion, even
though the police cannot do the same (not without a good reason), and even though, depending on how we measure harm,
the need to bring murderers, rapists, and robbers to book may
be greater than the need to force compliance with regulatory
schemes enforced by agencies such as the IRS, FTC, EPA, and
OSHA." Stuntz considers and rejects seven possible explanations 86 for this discrepancy before offering his own: the coerciveness of most police practices is not reduplicated in regu-

180. See id. at 1054-60.
181. See id. at 1034-47.
182. See id. at 1050-53 (discussing Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1
(1948), Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927), and Hale v.
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906)).
183. I& at 1053.
184. Id. at 1054.
185. See id. at 1035-36.
186. See id. at 1034-47. The seven categories are 1) categorical balancing, 2) drawing lines between individuals and institutions, 3) the search-

subpoena line, 4) the right-privilege distinction, 5) separating disclosure
to the government from disclosure to the public, 6) privacy as a remedy,
not a right, and 7) representation reinforcement. See id. at 1035-44.
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latory contexts.187
But is that really the difference? If we removed from
Stuntz's proof every case that involves self-disclosure and institutions, there would be very little left of the regulatory war on
privacy he describes.' Tax laws and subpoenas coerce us;
however, this coercion is justifiable because both entail actions
by, not just against, the suspect."8 9 (Is this not essential to
Kaflk's Der Prozess? Not only that K. may be causing, acting,
doing, but that if he were not, it would not be a "process" at
all?)'9 This participatory element is especially striking with
subpoenas, which have the added procedural virtue of being
susceptible to ex ante challenge.'91
Yet for Stuntz, what justifies the coercion of self-reporting
requirements and subpoenas is that neither entails potentially
violent face-to-face encounters. When Stuntz moves away from
instances of self-disclosure to regulatory cases involving faceto-face encounters between inspectors and their search victims,
his previously noted extended sense of coercion is certainly
wide enough to cover what goes on there.'92 I agree with
Stuntz that regulatory inspections are rarely violent 93 and
187. See id. at 1060-77.
188. Stuntz cites cases that involve self-disclosure documents such as
tax returns and subpoenas, and institutions such as corporations, partnerships, labor unions, public employers, and schools. See id at 1030-31,
1037-39, 1051-54, 1057.60 (citing Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99
(1988); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987); New York v. Burger,
482 U.S. 691 (1987); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987); Dow
Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986); New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325 (1985); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981); Fisher v.
United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976); Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1
(1948); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927); Hale v. Henkel,
201 U.S. 43 (1906); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896); Commonwealth v. Snyder, 597 N.E.2d 1363 (Mass. 1992)).
189. Cf HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LimnIs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION
157 (1968) ("The alleged criminal is not merely an object to be acted
upon but an independent entity in the process who may, if he so desires,

. .

.

play an active role . . . ").

190. See FRANZ KAFKA, DER PROZESs (Max Brod trans., 1935).
191. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 8-13 (1973) (noting that
a grand-jury subpoena does not constitute an intrusion on privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment).
192. See supra notes 94-110 and accompanying text.
193. But see Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1976) (involving use of
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that they can uncover facts more private than those uncovered
in some police investigations.1 " What I cannot join is
Stuntz's belief that encounterless police investigations should
be more loosely controlled so they are better aligned with regulatory inspections.
One explanation for why regulators can get away with actions that the police cannot is that institutions have fewer
protections from various governmental actions than individuals
do.'95 Stuntz finds this explanation inadequate because institutions are fictive-they are composed of individuals whose
rights do not or should not dissolve into their group membership. 9 ' Moreover, in sharp contrast to the institutions to
which they belong, individuals can feel "noneconomic, intangible harm... in pure dignitary terms," whether they are acting
within or outside of the institution.9 7
It is true, to be stingy with groups is to be stingy with their
members: members, who, unlike the entity with which they
identify, can vote, bleed, and go to jail, but can't live forever.
What Stuntz misses, however, is that the whole point of group
economic action, particularly corporate action, is to dissolve the
individual. The exchange is literally profitable because it encourages individual investment in a free-market economy by
limiting an investor's financial liability, unless the individual
somehow subverts the group by ceasing to act for the
Group membership confers power on individuals
group.-'
which they otherwise lack. Thus, the law presupposes, and
psychological evidence backs up, that "[tlwo heads are better
than one," not that "[t]oo many cooks spoil the broth."1 99 Not
only are groups more likely to get their way, but they also tend
to monopolize social and economic opportunity and securicorporal punishment such as severe paddling to regulate students' behavior).
194. See Privacy's Problem, supra note 1, at 1035-36; see also supra
notes 94-110 and accompanying text.
195. See Privacy's Problem, supra note 1, at 1036-38.
196. See id. at 1037-38, 1053.
197. I& at 1036-37.
198. See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 282 (1943)
(noting that a corporate officer may be criminally liable for acts of corporation only when operating the corporation as his "alter ego").
199. KATZ, supra note 51, at 261.
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ty.2" 0 These virtues of groups are also their vices; they account not only for why we join them, but also for why we fear
them."' What else could explain why we jail anyone who
merely203 asks0 2 or agrees with someone else to commit a
crime?
Judge Posner has argued that "the trend toward elevating
personal and downgrading organizational privacy is mysterious
from an economic standpoint."2 To Posner, concealing one's
arrest record is hardly more deserving of protection than concealing one's business plans and operations, which are, Posner
complains, subject to the "public prying" of securities laws. 05
But, as Ian Macneil points out, it is not securities laws or
Leviathan in any other form that pose the greatest threat to
personal or entrepreneurial secrecy.0 Rather, it is private
groupings, particularly corporate bureaucracies relying on the
power of contract-not Leviathan-that typically run roughshod over individuals. Even if Posner is right, that the law too
steeply discounts the value of entrepreneurial secrecy, our laws
betray a profound skepticism, if not paranoia, about group
action and individual action within groups.2 Posner confirms this skepticism, which comes through each time we convict corporations even though, in John Coffee's words, there is
"no soul to damn or body to kick,"0 ' and each time we con200. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW, 18892, 194-98 (2d ed. 1985); IAN R. MACNEIL, CONTRACTS: EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS AND RELATIONS 367 (2d ed. 1978).

201. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 58 (Supp. 1995) at 2-3 (citing Clinton
Administration's gang legislation).
202. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.02 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
203. See id. § 5.03(1)(a)-(b).
204. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 249 (1981).
205. See id at 248-49.
206. See Ian R. Macneil, Bureaucracy, Liberalism, and Community--American Style, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 900, 918 n. 6 5 (1984-85); see also
Daniel R. Fischel & Alan 0. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD.
319, 339 (1996) ('The Pinto case contributed to the widespread criticism
of corporate America .... Corporations, the critics stressed, lacked ac-

countability .... Lawless behavior, including price-fixing, illegal political
contributions to domestic and foreign governments, environmental damage, and health and safety violations-was the norm rather than the
exception.").
207. See POSNER, supra note 204, at 248-49.
208. John C. Coffee, "No Soul to Damn.: No Body to Kick": An

1312

RUTGERS LAW REVIEW

[Vol.49:1283

vict corporate officers on the basis of strict liability," 9 which
is otherwise anathema to the criminal law. So too is corporate
free speech, while "not wholly outside the protection of the
First Amendment,"210 hardly free when compared with individual expression. Quite typically, behavior that is unactionable when it occurs on the street, e.g., sexual harassment, is
tortious when it occurs in the corporate setting.2 1 '
Outside of corporate life, government, with the Court's approval, often forces institutional actors to give themselves over,
or at least some of their rights, to the smooth functioning of
the group. For instance, the Court says it is acceptable to suspend a public high school student" 2 or fire a public employ21 4
ee21" for distasteful conversations or for long hair. Just as
an individual's right to be treated like an equal can trump an
individual's right to associate with a group,21 individuals can
be compelled to join groups and to finance some group expenditures.216 In addition, a group's right to "assemble" is narrower
Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79
MICH. L. REV. 386, 386 (1981).
209. See United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975) (using a strictliability analysis to uphold the conviction, under the Federal Food Drug
and Cosmetic Act, of the chief executive officer of a food retail chain for
unsanitary store conditions).
210. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 776 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring) (agreeing
with the majority that a Virginia statute barring the use of prices in
advertising for prescription drugs violates the First Amendment).
211. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (West 1994 & Supp. 1996).
212. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 507-08 (1969) (stating that schools could control general deportment
or length of skirts but could not ban the wearing of arm bands to protest the Vietnam War).
213. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983) (upholding the
dismissal of an assistant district attorney who protested a transfer by
circulating an intra-office questionnaire dealing with transfer policy,
among other issues).
214. See Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 244 (1976) (holding that a
hair-length regulation for county police officers did not constitute a "substantial claim of infringement on the individual's freedom of choice with
respect to certain basic matters").
215. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 612 (1984)
(upholding a Minnesota statute that prohibited groups like the Jaycees
from excluding persons from membership based on gender).
216. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 244 (1977)
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than an individual's right to speak freely,217 and remedies for
defamation are reserved for individuals, not institutions.2 18

Again, while I know Posner thinks the law has this backwards
because innovation pervades group life,1 9 my point here is
that the law's comparatively low valuation of group activity is
actually more firmly established than Stuntz admits. The legitimacy of a regulatory regime thus depends as much on the
nature of group or institutional life as on the absence of coercion in the enforcement of such a regime.
Stuntz indicates elsewhere that he, too, thinks that looser
constraints on regulatory action are symptomatic of the nature
of institutional life regardless of the force used or not used by
regulatory inspectors.' ° In Implicit Bargains, Government
Power, and the Fourth Amendment,22 Stuntz argues that the
broader-than-normal search rights of regulatory inspectors are
implicitly agreed to by search victims, who would rather be
searched than face other, presumably worse, sanctions at
regulators' disposal.222 For example, students may resent
school officials searching their purses, but since students can
be kicked out of school for almost anything, the search is preferable to all but the most lawless students.' This "implicit

(Powell, J. concurring) ("[Tihe Court apparently rules that public employees can be compelled by the State to pay full union dues to a union with
which they disagree.").
217. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 912 (1982)
(recognizing that boycotts "may have a disruptive effect on local economic
conditions" and thus may be subject to some forms of governmental regulation).
218. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 16.32, at 1089 n.9 (5th ed. 1995); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 111, at 784 (5th ed. 1984).
219. See Posner, supra note 171, at 404-05.
220. See Privacy's Problem, supra note 1, at 1057-59 (highlighting the
difference between the Fourth Amendment protection against searches to
solve or prevent serious crimes and the lesser protection against searches
by "special needs" governmental agencies); Substantive Origins, supra
note 2, at 445 (observing the adoption of a rational basis scrutiny applied
to non-police searches that are not deemed "outrageous").
221. 44 STAN. L. REv. 553 (1992).
222. See idtat 567-75 (discussing the "implicit bargain" between receiving a governmental benefit and consenting to regulatory search).
223. See id. at 571 ("the upshot is that restricting school searches
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bargain" theory holds that the greater discretionary power of
officials to punish wrongdoers on little or no suspicion not only
includes the lesser power to investigate them on little or no
suspicion, but actually makes the wielding of the lesser power
preferable to the subjects of official action.2
If Stuntz is conditioning his "implicit bargain" theory on the
lack of official coercion, then he should say so. But again, even
if Stuntz means to impose such a condition, it is not so clear
that the Court is set against official coercion in regulatory
settings.'
CONCLUSION

There is coercion in police investigation. But whether the
police needlessly punching homeowners in the face is typical
police behavior is a complicated empirical question. That the
Court may have overlooked or even ignored this mode of police
behavior in one case"' does not, however, without more,
mean that coercion is underlitigated, under-regulated, or susceptible to improvement through judicial rather than administrative action. While I am not sure that the Court can do more
than it already does to regulate the use of deadly and
nondeadly force in police practices, I am sure that the problem
of police coercion is far from demonstrated by stretching the
meaning of "coercion" all out of shape. Indeed, I doubt seriously that coercion can carry the load Stuntz asks it to in instances of, for example, plain view, consent, and stalking.
I do not wish to be misunderstood: Stuntz is quite correct to
insist that coercion matters. But privacy also matters, despite
the bad rap it has gotten lately in the cases and commentary.' In fact, so much of what the police do is both coercive
might be expensive [to the] students").
224. See id. at 567-75.
225. See 'supra notes 94-110 and accompanying text.
226. See Privacy's Problem, supra note 1, at 1066-68 (discussing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987)).

227. See supra notes 21-34 and accompanying text.
228. See e.g., Scott E. Sundby, "Everyman"'s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L.
REv. 1751, 1777-87 (1994) (dealing with problems of privacy by redescribing them as problems of trust).
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and hostile to privacy that it is puzzling that Stuntz would go
to so much trouble to decouple them. When privacy and liberty
interests can be decoupled-when police act, but not coercively-privacy is still worth protecting, even in lowly cigarette
packages and paper sacks.
That targets of regulatory inspections have so little privacy
may, as Stuntz argues, have something to do with the, absence
of coercion in those settings. But while regulatory inspectors
are not generally as rough as police, inspectors' broader investigatory intrusions into the regulatory world do make sense in
privacy terms because of the inherent risks that institutional
life poses to individual privacy. Unless Stuntz envisions constitutional law as "a featureless plane of undifferentiated
rights, 9 which he does not, there is nothing controversial
about suggesting (or merely observing), as I do, that our rights
as individuals are more important than our rights as members
of groups.

229. See John C. Jeffries, Jr. & Wiliam J. Stuntz, Ineffective Assistance
and Procedural Default in Federal Habeas Corpus, 57 U. CHI. L. REV.
679, 706-07 (1990).

